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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant Appellant's motion for a new trial based upon 
prosecutorial misconduct. Contrary to the State's argument, Appellant's argument on appeal 
is not based upon Rimmasch, but on prosecutorial misconduct in eliciting evidence as to the 
alleged victim's behavior changes, over the instruction of the trial court. The trial court 
indicated that this particular line of questioning had gone far enough, but the prosecutor 
below did not follow the trial court's instruction. 
Further, Appellant submits that this Court should address his constitutional 
argument with respect to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(h), because it has significant public 
interest and is capable of being repeated. Appellant submits that this Court can remand for 
consideration of the other statutory requirements, or in the alternative, address this issue that 
may not be ripe for review based upon its important constitutional implications. Moreover, 
this Court should find that subsection (h) of § 76-5-406.5 is unconstitutional given the 
ramifications that a defendant's self-incrimination could have on future proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT ARGUES FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, AND NOT BASED UPON 
RIMMASCH 
The State responds to Appellant's argument that a mistrial should have been 
granted, by arguing that Blazor's testimony did not violate State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 
(Utah 1989), by commenting on the alleged victim's veracity. However, that was not the only 
basis for which Appellant sought a mistrial below, and is not the basis upon which Appellant 
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argues on appeal. Appellant argued below that there was misconduct on the part of the 
prosecutor by repeatedly attempting to elicit information after the trial court had indicated 
he should move on from that line of inquiry and not lead the witness.(R.312 at 287). 
The prosecutor in the trial court questioned Blazor as to how the alleged 
victim's conduct changed or how she was different after the allegation of abuse. The trial 
court did allow several questions and answers in that regard, but after the prosecutor was 
leading the witness, the trial court attempted to put an end to this line of questioning. The 
prosecutor, however, continued with questions as to how the alleged victim's behavior was 
different. This prompted another objection by Appellant's counsel, which was sustained. The 
basis for the motion for a mistrial was that the prosecutor had attempted elicit evidence 
improper for the jury's consideration and had ignored the trial court's ruling. 
Appellant does not rely upon Rimmasch in his argument on appeal, therefore, 
the State's argument that Rimmasch is not applicable is irrelevant. As argued in his Opening 
Brief, "a prosecutor's comments constitute misconduct when they call the jurors' attention 
to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a reasonable 
likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict." State v. Pearson, 
943 P.2d 1347,1352 (Utah 1997), cited in State v. Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68 at ^  9,21 P.3d 
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1142. Even though some of the questions from the prosecutor were sustained and no 
answers were given, by implication and the leading questions, it is natural to assume that the 
jury did consider evidence of the alleged victim's behavior changes, which the trial court 
determined were not appropriate. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406.5(h) BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF 
BEING REPEATED AND AFFECTS A SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC 
INTEREST 
The State argues that this Court should not address Appellant's constitutional 
claim because there has not been an adequate showing that he would have been amenable 
to rehabilitation through treatment or whether he had undergone a psychological evaluation.l 
The State further claims that Appellant has waived any opportunity to remand this issue to 
the district court. However, the State has failed to recognize that this issue was the central 
basis for the trial court granting a certificate of probable cause, so that this issue may be 
addressed on appeal. 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5 provides in subsection (i) for a finding that 
rehabilitation through treatment is probable, and under subsection (j) that a defendant has 
undergone a psychological evaluation, prior to the court considering probation. 
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This Court may remand this to the trial court to determine whether Appellant 
has met the requirements under subsections (i) and (j) of the statute, but that precludes one 
of the central purpose of this appeal and the trial court's decision in granting Appellant's 
petition for a certificate of probable cause. 
In addition, Appellant submits that this Court should address this issue 
regardless of any remand considerations because this is an issue that is capable of evading 
review, but being repeated. This issue, as raised by Appellant in his Opening Brief, is critical 
in light of the issues raised in State of Utah v. Gino Maestas, Case No. 20000094-SC, 
which this Court has yet to rule upon. 
This issue of ripeness can be analogized to circumstances where the courts 
have addressed moot issues. Moot or not yet ripe issues may be considered, "if a case 
presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief 
time anyone is affected, is capable of evading review." State v. Wilkensen, 2000 UT App 
383. The issue in the instant case also presents an important aspect of law which affects the 
public interest and is likely to recur. Although the issue may not necessarily be capable of 
evading review, Appellant submits that this is such an important issue that affects 
defendants' constitutional rights, this Court should address the issue. See also State v. C.A, 
1999 UT App 390, 995 P.2d 17 (where the court stated it would "reach the merits of this 
-5-
issue [juvenile court authority in terminating parental rights] because it is of significant 
public import and is likely to recur"). 
Appellant submits that the general exception to the mootness doctrine should 
apply to reach this important constitutional issue. "Where an exception to the mootness 
doctrine is present, courts historically have exercised this discretionary authority in 'class 
actions, questions of constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or construction of 
a statute, or the propriety of administrative rulings."' Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citations omitted)(emphasis added). Although this is not necessarily 
a mootness issue, the theory and principles in addressing it are the same, given that the issue 
may not yet be ripe for review. 
As to the merits of this issue, Appellant submits that the State is incorrect in 
arguing that such a choice is not punishment. The statute is essentially meaningless if it 
requires defendants to incriminate themselves, and effectively give up any legitimate appeal 
rights. Following Appellant's rationale, if the portion of the statute is upheld, and a 
defendant must admit guilt to be considered for probation, he may effectively give up any 
legitimate appeal issues, or benefit of a possible reversal on appeal, because at a new trial, 
his incriminating statements could be introduced against him. For defendants who maintain 
their innocence at trial and have meritorious issues on appeal, this section of the statute 
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thwarts any benefit of a new trial, because admitting guilt post-trial, could be admitted 
against them in a new proceeding. This issue is not akin to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and downward departure arguments used by the State. See Aplee. Brf. at 34-36. 
Additionally, the issue in McKune v. Lile, 2002 WL 1270605, raised by the State dealt with 
post-sentencing prison regulations, not pre-sentencing commitment versus probation issues 
as in the instant case. 
Appellant does recognize the strong state interest is treating sex offenders, but 
that interest is outweighed in this particular circumstance by a defendant's interest in be able 
to protect his constitutional right against self-incrimination without negative consequences. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse 
his conviction as to Count II and/or grant him a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 2002. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
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Marian Decker 
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